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We describe a theoretical model of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying conscious
presence and its disturbances.The model is based on interoceptive prediction error and is
informed by predictive models of agency, general models of hierarchical predictive coding
and dopaminergic signaling in cortex, the role of the anterior insular cortex (AIC) in intero-
ception and emotion, and cognitive neuroscience evidence from studies of virtual reality
and of psychiatric disorders of presence, specifically depersonalization/derealization disor-
der.The model associates presence with successful suppression by top-down predictions
of informative interoceptive signals evoked by autonomic control signals and, indirectly, by
visceral responses to afferent sensory signals. The model connects presence to agency
by allowing that predicted interoceptive signals will depend on whether afferent sensory
signals are determined, by a parallel predictive-coding mechanism, to be self-generated or
externally caused. Anatomically, we identify the AIC as the likely locus of key neural com-
parator mechanisms. Our model integrates a broad range of previously disparate evidence,
makes predictions for conjoint manipulations of agency and presence, offers a new view of
emotion as interoceptive inference, and represents a step toward a mechanistic account
of a fundamental phenomenological property of consciousness.
Keywords: presence, consciousness, depersonalization disorder, agency, interoception, insular cortex,
virtual reality, predictive coding
INTRODUCTION
In consciousness science, psychiatry, and virtual reality (VR), the
concept of presence is used to refer to the subjective sense of reality
of the world and of the self within the world (Metzinger, 2003;
Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005). Presence is a characteristic of
most normal healthy conscious experience. However, theoretical
models of the neural mechanisms responsible for presence, and its
disorders, are still lacking (Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005).
Selective disturbances of conscious presence are manifest in
dissociative psychiatric disorders such as depersonalization (loss
of subjective sense of reality of the self) and derealization (loss of
subjective sense of reality of the world). Depersonalization disor-
der (DPD), characterized by the chronic circumscribed expression
of these symptoms (Phillips et al., 2001; Sierra et al., 2005; Simeon
et al., 2009; Sierra and David, 2011), can therefore provide a useful
model for understanding presence. In VR, presence is used in a
subjective–phenomenal sense to refer to the sense of now being
in a virtual environment (VE) rather than in the actual physical
environment (Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005). These perspectives
are complementary:While studies of DPD can help identify candi-
date neural mechanisms underlying presence in normal conscious
experience, studies of VR can help identify how presence can be
generated even in situations where it would normally be lack-
ing. Here, we aim to integrate insights into presence from these
different perspectives within a single theoretical framework and
model.
Our framework is based on interoceptive predictive coding
within the anterior insular cortex (AIC) and associated brain
regions. Interoception refers to the perception of the physiologi-
cal condition of the body, a process associated with the autonomic
nervous system and with the generation of subjective feeling states
(James, 1890; Critchley et al., 2004; Craig, 2009). Interoception
can be contrasted with exteroception which refers to (i) per-
ception of the environment via the classical sensory modalities,
and (ii) proprioception and kinesthesia reflecting the position
and movement of the body in space (Sherrington, 1906; Craig,
2003; Critchley et al., 2004; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Pre-
dictive coding is a powerful framework for conceiving of the
neural mechanisms underlying perception, cognition, and action
(Rao and Ballard, 1999; Bubic et al., 2010; Friston, 2010). Simply
put, predictive coding models describe counter flowing top-down
prediction/expectation signals and bottom-up prediction error
signals. Successful perception, cognition and action are associ-
atedwith successful suppression (“explaining away”) of prediction
error. Applied to interoception, predictive coding implies that
subjective feeling states are determined by predictions about the
interoceptive state of the body, extending the James–Lange, and
Schachter–Singer theories of emotion (James, 1890; Schachter
and Singer, 1962). Predictive coding models have previously been
applied to the sense of agency (the sense that a person’s action is
the consequence of his or her intention). Such models propose
that disturbances of sensed agency, for example in schizophrenia,
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arise from imprecise predictions about the sensory consequences
of actions (Frith, 1987; Blakemore et al., 2000; Synofzik et al.,
2010; Voss et al., 2010). In one line of previous work, Verschure
et al. (2003) proposed that presence in a VE is associated with
good matches between expected and actual sensorimotor signals,
leveraging a prediction-based model of behavior (“distributed
adaptive control”; Bernardet et al., 2011). However, to our knowl-
edge, computationally explicit predictive coding models have not
been formally applied to presence, nor to interoceptive percep-
tions. Anatomically, we focus on the AIC because this region has
been strongly implicated in interoceptive representation and in
the associated generation of subjective feeling states (interoceptive
awareness; Critchley et al., 2004;Craig, 2009;Harrison et al., 2010);
moreover, AIC activity in DPD is abnormally low (Phillips et al.,
2001).
In brief, ourmodel proposes that presence is the result of success-
ful suppression by top-down predictions of informative interoceptive
signals evoked (directly) by autonomic control signals and (indi-
rectly) by bodily responses to afferent sensory signals. According to
the model, disorders of presence (as in DPD) follow from patho-
logically imprecise interoceptive predictive signals. The model
integrates presence and agency while proposing that they are nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for each other, offers a novel view
of emotion as “interoceptive inference,” and is relevant to emerg-
ingmodels of selfhood based on proprioception andmultisensory
integration. Importantly, the model is testable via novel combi-
nations of VR, neuroimaging, and manipulation of physiological
feedback.
Themodel is motivated by several lines of theory and evidence,
including: (i) general models of hierarchically organized predic-
tive coding in cortex, following principles of Bayesian inference
(Neal and Hinton, 1998; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2009;
Bubic et al., 2010); (ii) the importance of insular cortex (par-
ticularly the AIC) in integrating interoceptive and exteroceptive
signals, and in generating subjective feeling states (Critchley et al.,
2002, 2004; Craig, 2009; Harrison et al., 2010); (iii) suggestions
and observations of prediction errors in insular cortex (Paulus
and Stein, 2006; Gray et al., 2007; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Singer
et al., 2009; Bossaerts, 2010); (iv) evidence of abnormal insula acti-
vation in DPD (Phillips et al., 2001; Sierra and David, 2011); (v)
models of the subjective sense of “agency” (and its disturbance in
schizophrenia) framed in terms of predicting the sensory conse-
quences of self-generated actions (Frith, 1987, 2011; Synofzik et al.,
2010;Voss et al., 2010); and (vi) theory and evidence regarding the
role of dopamine in signaling prediction errors and in optimizing
their precision (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000; Fiorillo et al., 2003;
Friston et al., 2006; Fletcher and Frith, 2009).
In the remainder of this paper, we first define the concept
of presence in greater detail. We then introduce the theoretical
model before justifying its components with reference to each of
the areas just described. We finish by extracting from the model
some testable predictions, discussing related modeling work, and
noting some potential challenges.
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PRESENCE
The concept of presence has emerged semi-independently in
different fields (VR, psychiatry, consciousness science, philoso-
phy) concerned with understanding basic features of normal and
abnormal conscious experience. The concepts from each field
partially overlap. InVR,presence has both subjective–phenomenal
and objective–functional interpretations. In the former, presence
is understood as the sense of now being in a VE while transiently
unaware of one’s real location and of the technology delivering
the sensory input and recording the motor output (Jancke et al.,
2009); a more compact definition is simply “the sense of being
there” (Lombard and Ditton, 1997) or “being now there” (Met-
zinger, 2003). The objective interpretation is based on establishing
a behavioral/functional equivalence between virtual and real envi-
ronments: “the key to the approach is that the sense of “being
there” in a VE is grounded on the ability to “do there”” (Sanchez-
Vives and Slater, 2005; p.333). In this paper we focus on the former
interpretation asmost relevant to the phenomenology of presence.
Within psychiatry, presence is often discussed with reference
to its disturbance or absence in syndromes such as DPD and
early (prodromal) stages of psychoses. A useful characterization
of DPD is provided by Ackner (1954): “a subjective feeling of
internal and/or external change, experienced as one of strangeness
or unreality.”A common description given byDPD patients is that
their conscious experiences of the self and the world have an“as if”
character; the objects of perception seems unreal and distant, or
unreachable “as if” behind a mirror or window. DPD patients do
not normally suffer delusions or hallucinations, marking a clear
distinction from full-blownpsychoses such as schizophrenia; how-
ever, it is increasingly recognized that symptoms of DPD may
characterize prodromal stages of psychosis (Moller and Husby,
2000) potentially providing diagnostic, prognostic, and explana-
tory value. There is a clear overlap between the usages of presence
in DPD and VR in picking out the subjective feeling of “being
there.” In the former case the sense of “being there” is lost, and
in the latter, its generation is desired. More generally, presence
can be considered as a constitutive property of conscious experi-
ence. Following Metzinger, a “temporal window of presence” can
be understood as precipitating a subjective conscious “now” from
the flow of objective time (Metzinger, 2003). Metzinger further
connects the concept of presence to that of transparency, which
refers to the fact that our perceptions of the world and of the self
appear direct, unmediated by the neurocognitivemechanisms that
in fact give rise to them.Here,we do not treat explicitly the tempo-
ral aspect of presence, and transparency and presence are treated
synonymously. Considered this way, although presence can vary
in its intensity, it is a characteristic of conscious experiences gen-
erally and not an instance of any specific conscious experience
(e.g., an experience of a red mug); in other words, presence can
be considered to be a“structural property”of consciousness (Seth,
2009).
Considering these perspectives together, there is a natural ambi-
guity about whether it is presence itself, or its absence in particular
conditions, that is the core phenomenological explanatory tar-
get. However, in either case it remains necessary to formulate a
model describing the relevant neurocognitive constraints.We now
introduce such a model.
AN INTEROCEPTIVE PREDICTIVE-CODING MODEL OF
CONSCIOUS PRESENCE
Figure 1depicts the functional architecture of theproposedmodel.
It consists of two primary components, an “agency component”
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 395 | 2
Seth et al. Interoceptive predictive coding and conscious presence
FIGURE 1 | An interoceptive predictive coding model of
conscious presence. Both agency and presence components
comprise state and error units; state units generate control signals
(Aout, P out) and make predictions [Apred, P pred, Apred(p)] about the
consequent incoming signals (Ain, P in); error units compare
predictions with afferents, generating error signals [Aerr, P err, Aerr(p)]. In
the current version of the model the agency component is
hierarchically located above the presence component, so that it
generates predictions about the interoceptive consequences of
sensory input generated by motor control signals.
and a “presence component,” mutually interacting according to
hierarchical Bayesian principles and connected, respectively, with
a sensorimotor system and an autonomic/motivational system.
Each main component has a “state module” and an “error mod-
ule.” The core concept of the model is that a sense of presence
arises when informative interoceptive prediction signals are success-
fully matched to inputs so that prediction errors are suppressed. It
is not sufficient simply for there to be zero interoceptive predic-
tion error signals, as could happen for example in the absence
of any interoceptive signals allowing a simple prediction of “no
signal.” Rather, presence depends on a match between informa-
tive interoceptive signals and top-down predictions arising from
a dynamically evolving brain–body–world interaction. The same
considerations apply as well to the agency component.
The agency component is based on Frith’s well-established
“comparator model” of schizophrenia (Frith, 1987, 2011; Blake-
more et al., 2000), recently extended to a Bayesian framework
(Fletcher and Frith, 2009). In the state module of this component,
motor signals are generated which influence the sensorimotor sys-
tem (Aout); these motor signals are accompanied by prediction
signals (Apred) which attempt to predict the sensory consequences
of motor actions via a forward model informed by efference copy
and/or corollary discharge signals (Sommer and Wurtz, 2008).
Predicted and afferent sensory signals are compared in the error
module, generating a prediction error signal Aerr. In this model,
the subjective sense of agency depends on successful prediction of
the sensory consequences of action, i.e., suppression or “explain-
ing away” of the exteroceptive prediction error Apred. Following
previous models (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Synofzik et al., 2010),
disturbances in sensed agency arise not simply from predictive
mismatches, but from pathologically imprecise predictions about
the sensory consequences of action. Predictive coding schemes by
necessity involve estimates of precision (or inverse variance) since
prediction errors per se are otherwise meaningless. Experimen-
tally, it has been shown that imprecise predictions prompt patients
to rely more strongly on (and therefore adapt more readily to)
external cues, accounting for a key feature of schizophrenic phe-
nomenology in which actions are interpreted as having external
rather than internal causes (Synofzik et al., 2010). The preci-
sion of prediction error signals has been associated specifically
with dopaminergic activity (Fiorillo et al., 2003), suggesting a
proximate neuronal origin of schizophrenic symptomatology in
termsof abnormal dopaminergic neurotransmission (Fletcher and
Frith, 2009). Prediction error precision also features prominently
in recent models of hierarchical Bayesian networks, discussed in
Section “Prediction, Perception, and Bayesian Inference” (Friston
et al., 2006; Friston, 2009).
In the presence component, the autonomic system is driven
both by afferent sensory signals and by internally generated con-
trol signals from the state module (Pout), modulating the internal
physiological milieu. The state module is responsible for the gen-
eration of subjective emotional (feeling) states in accordance with
the principles of James and Lange, i.e., that subjective feelings
arise from perceptions of bodily responses to emotive stimuli
(Critchley et al., 2004; Craig, 2009) or equally, in accordance with
the Schachter and Singer model of emotion in which emotional
feelings arise through interpretation of interoceptive arousal sig-
nals within a cognitive context (e.g., Schachter and Singer, 1962;
Critchley et al., 2002). Extending these principles, in our model
emotional content is determined by the nature of the predictive
signals Ppred, and not simply by the “sensing” of interoceptive
signals per se (i.e., we apply the Helmholtzian perspective of
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perception as inference to subjective feeling states, see Interocep-
tion As Inference: A New View of Emotion?). As in the agency
component, there is also an error module which compares pre-
dicted interoceptive signals with actual interoceptive signals P in
via a forward model giving rise to an interoceptive prediction error
Perr (Paulus and Stein, 2006). In our model, the sense of pres-
ence is underpinned by a match between informative predicted
and actual interoceptive signals; disturbances of presence, as in
DPD, arise because of disturbances in this predictive mechanism.
Again, by analogy with the agency component (Fletcher and Frith,
2009; Synofzik et al., 2010) we propose that these disturbances
arise because of imprecise prediction signals Ppred.
In our model, the presence and agency components are inter-
connected. Importantly, this connection is not just analogical (i.e.,
justified with respect to shared predictive principles) but is based
on several lines of evidence. First, disorders of agency and pres-
ence often (but not always) co-occur (Robertson, 2000; Sumner
and Husain, 2008; Ruhrmann et al., 2010; Sierra and David, 2011;
see Summary). Second, manipulations of perceived agency can
influence reported presence, as shown in both healthy subjects
and schizophrenic patients (Lallart et al., 2009;Gutierrez-Martinez
et al., 2011). Third, as discussed below, abundant evidence points
to interactions between interoceptive and exteroceptive processes,
which in our model mediate interactions between the agency and
presence components. In the present version of the model, agency
is functionally localized at a higher hierarchical level thanpresence,
such that the agency state module generates both sensorimotor
predictions (Apred) and interoceptive predictions [Apred(p)]; cor-
respondingly, interoceptive prediction error signals are conveyed
to the agency state module [Aerr(p)] as well as to the presence state
module. This arrangement is consistent with evidence showing
that reported presence is modulated by perceived agency (Lal-
lart et al., 2009; Gutierrez-Martinez et al., 2011). Interestingly, in
this arrangement an additional generative component is needed
to generate predictive interoceptive signals given the current state
of both agency and presence components. We speculate that this
integrative generative model may be a key component of a core
sense of selfhood, in line with recent hierarchicalmodels of the self
(Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Feinberg, 2011) including those
based on perceptual aspects of global body ownership (Blanke
and Metzinger, 2009).
As just mentioned, a connection between presence and agency
mechanisms, whether hierarchical or reciprocal, in our model
requires interacting interoceptive and exteroceptive processes.
Theory and evidence regarding such interactions have a long his-
tory, extending back at least as far as James (1890) and prominent
in modern neural theories of consciousness (e.g., Edelman, 1989;
Humphrey, 2006; Craig, 2009). Consistent with our model, inte-
roceptive responses have recently been argued to shape predictive
inference during visual object recognition via affective predic-
tions generated in the orbitofrontal cortex (Barrett and Bar, 2009).
Intriguingly, susceptibility to the rubber-hand illusion (Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998) is anticorrelated with interoceptive sensitiv-
ity (as measured by a heartbeat detection task; Tsakiris et al.,
2011), suggesting an interaction between predictive models of
body ownership and interoception. People with lower interocep-
tive predictive ability may more readily assimilate exteroceptive
(e.g., correlated visual and tactile) cues in localizing interoceptive
and proprioceptive signals, while people with good interoceptive
predictive ability may rely less on these exteroceptive cues. Strik-
ingly, rubber-hand illusory experiences are associatedwith cooling
of the real hand, indicating an interaction between predictive
mechanisms and autonomic regulation (Moseley et al., 2008).
Despite the connection proposed between agency and presence,
our model implies that perceived agency is neither necessary nor
sufficient for presence, and vice versa. This position is consistent
with evidence that (i) experimental manipulations of perceived
agency need not evoke changes in autonomic responses such heart
rate and skin conductance (David et al., 2011), (ii) these auto-
nomic signals need not correlate with judgments of agency (David
et al., 2011), and (iii) as already mentioned, disorders of agency
and presence do not always co-occur (see Disorders of Agency and
Presence and Summary).
BRAIN BASIS OF THE MODEL
The model implicates a broad network of brain regions for both
the agency and the presence components. Neural correlates of the
sense of agency have been studied extensively, primarily bymanip-
ulating spatial or temporal delays to induce exteroceptive predic-
tive mismatches. Regions identified include motor areas (ventral
premotor cortex, supplementary, and pre-supplementary motor
areas and basal ganglia), the cerebellum, the posterior parietal
cortex, the posterior temporal sulcus, subregions of the prefrontal
cortex, and the anterior insula (Haggard, 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2010;
Nahab et al., 2011). Among these areas the pre-supplementary
motor area plays a key role in implementing complex, open
decisions among alternative actions and has been suggested as
a source of the so-called “readiness potential” identified in the
classic experiments of Libet on volition (Haggard, 2008). The
right angular gyrus of the inferior parietal cortex, and more gen-
erally the temporo-parietal-junction, are associated specifically
with awareness of the discrepancy between intended and actual
movements (Farrer et al., 2008; Miele et al., 2011) and have been
implicated in multisensory integration underlying exteroceptive
aspects of global body ownership relevant to selfhood (Blanke and
Metzinger, 2009).
The presence component also implicates a broad neural sub-
strate. We suggest that areas contributing to interoceptive pre-
dictive coding include specific brainstem (nucleus of the solitary
tract, periaqueductal gray, locus coeruleus), subcortical (sub-
stantia innominata, nucleus accumbens, amygdala), and cortical
(insular, orbitofrontal, and anterior cingulate) regions, potentially
forming at least a loose hierarchy (Critchley et al., 2004; Tami-
etto and de Gelder, 2010). Among these areas, the insular cortex
appears central to the integration of interoceptive and extero-
ceptive signals and to the generation of subjective feeling states.
The posterior and mid insula support the primary cortical rep-
resentation of interoceptive signals (Critchley et al., 2002, 2004;
Harrison et al., 2010), with the anterior insula (AIC) operating as
a comparator or error module (Paulus and Stein, 2006; Preuschoff
et al., 2008; Palaniyappan and Liddle, 2011). Interestingly, the AIC
is also differentially activated by changes in the sense of agency
(Tsakiris et al., 2010;Nahab et al., 2011), supporting a link between
mechanisms underlying agency and presence.
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 395 | 4
Seth et al. Interoceptive predictive coding and conscious presence
Autonomic control signals Pout are suggested to originate in
regions of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) which can be inter-
preted as “visceromotor cortex” for their function in the auto-
nomic modulation of bodily arousal to meet behavioral demand
(Pool and Ransohoff, 1949; Critchley et al., 2003; Critchley, 2009).
Equally, during motor behavior, premotor, supplementary, and
primary motor cortices are direct generators of autonomic vas-
cular changes through central command (Delgado, 1960) and a
parallel, partly reciprocal, systemof antisympathetic and parasym-
pathetic efferent drive operates through subgenual cingulate and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Nagai et al., 2004; Critchley, 2009;
Wager et al., 2009). The neural basis of interoceptive prediction
signals Ppred is suggested to overlap with these control mecha-
nisms,with emphasis on theACCand the orbitofrontal cortex. The
ACC has been associated with autonomic “efference copy” signals
(Harrison et al., 2010) and medial sectors of the orbitofrontal cor-
tex have robust connections with limbic, hypothalamic,midbrain,
brainstem, and spinal cord areas involved in internal state regula-
tion (Barbas, 2000; Barbas et al., 2003; Barrett and Bar, 2009). It is
noteworthy that ventromedial prefrontal including medial orbital
cortices also support primary and abstract representations of value
and reward across modalities (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011).
The AIC and the ACC (see Figure 2) are often coactivated
despite being spatially widely separated, forming a “salience net-
work” in conjunction with the amygdala and the inferior frontal
gyrus (Seeley et al., 2007;Medford and Critchley, 2010; Palaniyap-
pan and Liddle, 2011). The AIC and ACC are known to be
functionally (Taylor et al., 2009) and structurally (van den Heuvel
et al., 2009) connected. Interestingly,Craig has suggested thatAIC–
ACC connections are mediated via their distinctive populations
of von Economo neurons, which have rapid signal propagation
properties and are rich in dopamine D1 receptors (Hurd et al.,
2001; Craig, 2009). These areas have also been broadly impli-
cated in representations of reward expectation and reward pre-
diction errors in reinforcement learning contexts (see Disorders
of Agency and Presence and Rushworth and Behrens, 2008). A
recent model of medial prefrontal cortex, and especially ACC,
proposes that competing accounts treating error likelihood, con-
flict, and volatility and reward can be unified by a simple scheme
involving population-based predictions of action–outcome pair-
ings, whether good or bad (Alexander and Brown, 2011). ACC
responses are also modulated by the effort associated with an
expected reward (Croxson et al., 2009), implicating agency. These
observations provide further support for considering the salience
network as a central neural substrate of our model.
THE INSULAR CORTEX, INTEROCEPTION, AND EMOTION
The human insular cortex is a large and highly interconnected
structure, deeply embedded in the brain (see Figure 2; Augustine,
1996; Medford and Critchley, 2010; Deen et al., 2011). The insula
has been divided into several subregions based on connectivity and
cytoarchitectonic features (Mesulam and Mufson, 1982a,b; Muf-
son and Mesulam, 1982; Deen et al., 2011), with all subregions
implicated in visceral representation. Posterior and mid insula
support a primary representation of interoceptive information,
relayed from brainstem centers, notably the nucleus of the soli-
tary tract, which receives convergent visceral afferent inputs from
FIGURE 2 |The human cingulate (red) and insular (blue) cortices. Image
generated using Mango (http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/).
cranial nerves, predominantly vagus and glossopharyngeal nerves
(Mesulam and Mufson, 1982b), and spinal cord, particularly the
lamina-1 spinal tract (Craig, 2002). Blood-borne afferent signals
may also reach posterior insula via the solitary nucleus due to its
interaction with the area postrema (Shapiro and Miselis, 1985). A
secondary (re-)representation of interoceptive informationwithin
AIC is proposed to arise from forward flow of information from
posterior and mid insular cortices (Craig, 2002), augmented by
direct input from ventroposteriomedial thalamus. Bidirectional
connectionswith amygdala, nucleus accumbens, and orbitofrontal
cortex further suggest that the AIC is well placed to receive input
about (positive and negative) stimulus salience (Augustine, 1996).
Generally, AIC is considered as the principal cortical site for the
integration of interoceptive and exteroceptive signals.
The AIC is engaged across a wide range of processes that share
as a common factor visceral representation, interoception, and
emotional experience (Craig, 2002, 2009; Critchley et al., 2004;
Singer et al., 2009). The AIC is proposed to instantiate intero-
ceptive representations that are accessible to conscious awareness
as subjective feeling states (Critchley et al., 2004; Singer et al.,
2009). Evidence for this view comes in part from a study in which
individual differences in interoceptive sensitivity, as measured by
heartbeat detection, could be predicted by AIC activation and
morphometry (better performance associated with higher acti-
vation and higher gray matter volume) which in turn accounted
for individual differences in reported emotional symptoms. These
observations suggest a role for AIC both in interoceptive aware-
ness and in the generation of associated emotional feeling states
(Critchley et al., 2004; though see Khalsa et al., 2009 who show
that the AIC is not necessary for interoceptive sensitivity). Close
topographical relationships between different qualities of subjec-
tive emotional experience and differences in visceral autonomic
state have subsequently been reported within insula subregions
(Harrison et al., 2010). Also, the AIC is activated by observation,
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experience, and imagination of a strong emotion (disgust), though
with different functional connectivity patterns in each case (Jabbi
et al., 2008). Most generally, Craig (2009) suggests the AIC as
a “central neural correlate of consciousness,” drawing additional
attention to its possible role in the perception of flow of time.
Taken together, the evidence summarized so far underscores
AIC involvement in interoceptive processing, its contribution (in
particular with the ACC) to a wider salience network and its role
in the integration of exteroceptive signals with stimulus salience.
These processes within AIC appear to underlie subjective feeling
states. Consistent with this interpretation, we propose AIC to be
a comparator underlying the sense of presence. Specific support
for our model includes (i) evidence for predictive coding in the
AIC; (ii) hypoactivation of AIC in patients with DPD, and (iii)
modulation of AIC activity by reported subjective presence in VR
experiments. Before turning to this evidence we next discuss the
principles of predictive coding in more detail.
PREDICTION, PERCEPTION, AND BAYESIAN INFERENCE
Following the early insights of vonHelmholtz, there is now increas-
ing recognition of the importance of prediction, and prediction
error, in perception, cognition, and action (Hinton and Dayan,
1996; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Lee andMumford, 2003; Egner et al.,
2008; Friston, 2009; Summerfield and Egner, 2009; Bubic et al.,
2010; Mathews et al., 2012). The concept of “predictive coding”
overturns classical notions of perception as a largely bottom-up
process of evidence-accumulation or feature-detection driven by
impinging sensory signals, proposing instead that perceptual con-
tent is determined by top-down predictive signals arising from
multi-level generative models of the external causes of sensory
signals, which are continually modified by bottom-up prediction
error signals communicating mismatches between predicted and
actual signals across hierarchical levels (see Figure 3). In this view,
even low-level perceptual content is determined via a cascade of
predictions flowing from very general abstract expectations which
constrain successively more detailed (fine-grained) predictions.
We emphasize that in these frameworks bottom-up/feed-forward
signals convey prediction errors, and top-down/feed-back signals
convey predictions determining content. The great power of pre-
dictive coding frameworks is that they formalize the concept of
inductive inference, just as classical logic formalizes deductive
inference (Dorling, 1982; Barlow, 1990).
Predictive coding models are now well-established in account-
ing for various features of perception (Rao andBallard,1999;Yuille
and Kersten, 2006), cognition (Grush, 2004), and motor control
(Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000) (see Bubic et al., 2010 for a
review). Two examples from visual perception are worth high-
lighting. In an early study (Rao and Ballard, 1999) implemented
a model of visual processing utilizing a predictive coding scheme.
When exposed to natural images, simulated neurons developed
receptive-field properties observed in simple visual cells (e.g.,
oriented receptive-fields) as well as non-classical receptive-field
effects such as “end-stopping.” These authors pointed out that
predictive coding is computationally and metabolically efficient
since neural networks learn the statistical regularities embed-
ded in their inputs, reducing redundancy by removing the pre-
dictable components of afferent signals and transmitting only
residual errors. More recently, Egner and colleagues elegantly
showed that repetition suppression (decreased cortical responses
to familiar stimuli) is better explained by predictive coding than
by alternative explanations based on adaptation or sharpening
of representations. Their key finding is that repetition suppres-
sion can be abolished when the local likelihood of repetitions is
manipulated so that repetitions become unexpected (Egner et al.,
2008).
Theoretically, computational accounts of predictive coding
have now reached high levels of sophistication (Dayan et al., 1995;
Hinton and Dayan, 1996; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Lee and Mum-
ford,2003; Friston et al., 2006; Friston,2009). These accounts lever-
age the hierarchical organization of cortex to show how generative
FIGURE 3 | A schematic of hierarchical predictive coding across three
cortical regions; the “lowest” (R1) on the left and the “highest” (R3) on
the right. Light blue cells represent state units, orange cells represent error
units. Note that predictions and prediction errors are sent and received from
each level in the hierarchy. Feed-forward signals conveying prediction errors
originate in superficial layers and terminate in deep (infragranular) layers of
their targets, are associated with gamma-band oscillations, and are
mediated by GABA and fast AMPA receptor kinetics. Conversely, feedback
signals conveying predictions originate in deep layers and project to
superficial layers, are associated with beta-band oscillations, and are
mediated by slow NMDA receptor kinetics. Adapted from (Friston, 2009;
see alsoWang, 2010).
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models underlying top-down predictions can be induced empiri-
cally via hierarchical Bayesian inference. Bayesian methods pro-
vide a computational mechanism for estimating the probable
causes of data (posterior distribution) given the observed con-
ditional probabilities of the data and associated priors; in other
words, Bayes’ theorem relates a conditional probability (which
can be observed) to its inverse (which cannot be observed, but
knowledge of which is desired).
As illustrated in Figure 3, in these models each layer attempts
to suppress activity in the layer immediately below, as well as
within the same layer, and each layer passes prediction errors
related to its own activity both internally and to the layer imme-
diately above. From a Bayesian perspective, top-down influences
constitute empirically induced priors on the causes of their
input. Advances in machine learning theory based on hierar-
chical Bayesian inference (Dayan et al., 1995; Neal and Hinton,
1998; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston et al., 2006; Friston, 2009)
show how these schemesmay operate in practice. Recent attention
has focused on Friston’s “free energy” principle (Friston et al.,
2006; Friston, 2009) which, following earlier work by Hinton
and colleagues (e.g., Hinton and Dayan, 1996; Neal and Hin-
ton, 1998), shows how generative models can be hierarchically
induced from data by assuming that the brain minimizes a bound
on the evidence for a model of the data. The machine learn-
ing algorithms able to perform this minimization are based on
so-called “variational Bayes” worked out by (Neal and Hinton,
1998) among others; these algorithms have plausible neurobio-
logical implementations, at least in cortical hierarchies (Hinton
and Dayan, 1996; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston et al., 2006;
Friston, 2009).
Interestingly, the precision of prediction error signals plays a
key role in these models on the grounds that hierarchical mod-
els of perception require optimization of the relative precision of
top-down predictions and bottom-up evidence (Friston, 2009).
This process corresponds to modulating the gain of error units
at each level, implemented by neuromodulatory systems. While
for exteroception this may involve cholingeric neurotransmission
via attention (Yu andDayan, 2005); for interoception, propriocep-
tion, and value-learning, prediction error precision is suggested to
be encoded by dopamine (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Friston, 2009). The
role of dopamine in ourmodel is discussed further in Section“The
Role of Dopamine.”
It is important to emphasize that in predictive coding frame-
works, predictions and prediction errors interact over rapid (syn-
chronic) timescales providing a constitutive basis for the cor-
responding perceptions, cognitions, and actions. This timescale
is distinct from the longer (diachronic) timescales across which
the brain might learn temporal relations among stimuli (Schultz
and Dickinson, 2000), or form expectations about the timing and
nature of future events (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007).
In summary, predictive coding may capture a general princi-
ple of cortical functional organization. It fluently explains a broad
range of evidence (though a key prediction, that of distinct “state”
and “error” neurons in different cortical laminae, remains to be
established) and has attractive computational properties, at least
in the context of visual perception. It has been applied to agency,
where by extending Frith’s comparator model it suggests that
disorders of agency arise from pathologically imprecise predic-
tions about the sensory consequences of self-generated actions.
However the framework has not yet been formally applied to
interoception or to presence.
INTEROCEPTION AS INFERENCE: A NEW VIEW OF EMOTION?
Predictive coding models of interoceptive processing have not yet
been elaborated. Such a model forms a key component of our
model of presence, offering a starting point for predictive models
of interoception and emotion generally.
Interoceptive concepts of emotion were first crystallized by
James and Lange who argued that emotions arise from percep-
tion of physiological changes in the body. This basic idea has been
influential over the last century, underpinningmore recent frame-
works for understanding emotion such as the “somatic marker
hypothesis” of Damasio (2000), the “sentient self” model (Craig,
2002, 2009), and“interoceptive awareness” (Critchley et al., 2004).
Despite the advances embedded in these frameworks, interocep-
tion remains generally understood along “feed-forward” lines,
similar to classical feature-detection or evidence-accumulation
theories of visual perception. However, it has long been recog-
nized that cognitively explicit beliefs about the causes of physi-
ological changes can influence subjective feeling states (Cannon,
1915). Some 50 years ago, Schachter and Singer (1962) famously
demonstrated that injections of adrenaline, proximally causing
a variety of significant physiological changes, could give rise to
either anger or elation depending on the concurrent context
(an irritated or elated confederate), an observation formalized in
their “two factor” theory in which subjective emotions are deter-
mined by a combination of cognitive factors and physiological
conditions.
Though it involves expectations, Schachter and Singer’s the-
ory falls considerably short of a full predictive coding model of
emotion. Drawing a parallel with models of perception, predictive
interoception would involve hierarchically cascading top-down
interoceptive predictions counter flowing with bottom-up inte-
roceptive prediction errors, with subjective feeling states being
determined by the joint content of the top-down predictions
across multiple hierarchical levels. In other words, according to
the model emotional content is determined by a suite of hier-
archically organized generative models predicting interoceptive
responses to external stimuli and/or internal physiological control
signals (Figure 4).
It is important to distinguish interoceptive predictive coding
from more generic interactions between prediction and emotion.
As already mentioned, predictive coding involves prediction at
synchronic, fast time-scales, such that predictions (and prediction
errors) are constitutive of (emotional) content. Approaching this
idea, Barrett and Bar (2009) propose that affective (interoceptive)
predictions shape visual object recognition at fast timescales, how-
ever they do not contend that such predictions are the constitutive
basis of emotions in the full predictive coding sense. Many previ-
ous studies have examined how predictions can influence emotion
over longer, diachronic, timescales (Ploghaus et al., 1999; Porro
et al., 2003; Ueda et al., 2003; Gilbert andWilson, 2009); the brain
networks involved in emotional predictions across time reliably
include prefrontal cortex and the ACC.
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FIGURE 4 | Predictive coding applied to interoception. Motor control and
autonomic control signals evoke interoceptive responses [intero(actual)] either
directly (autonomic control) or indirectly via the musculoskeletal system and
the environment (motor control). These responses are compared to predicted
responses [intero(pred)], which are generated by hierarchically organized
forward/generative models informed by motor and autonomic efference copy
signals. The comparison, which may take place in AIC, generates a prediction
error which refines the generative models. Subjective feeling states are
associated with predicted interoceptive signals intero(pred). The figure is
adapted from a general schematic of predictive coding in (Bubic et al., 2010).
PREDICTIVE CODING IN THE AIC
A key requirement of our model is that the AIC participates in
interoceptive predictive coding. In a related influential model
of anxiety, Paulus and Stein (2006) suggest that insular cortex
compares predicted to actual interoceptive signals, with subjec-
tive anxiety associated with heightened interoceptive prediction
error signals. In line with their model, highly anxious individuals
show increased AIC activity during emotion processing (Paulus
and Stein, 2006). AIC responses to stimuli are modulated by
expectations: When participants are exposed to a highly aversive
taste, while falsely expecting only a moderately aversive taste, they
report less aversion than when having accurate information about
the stimulus, with corresponding attenuation of evoked activity
withinAIC (and adjacent frontal operculum;Nitschke et al., 2006).
Moreover, AIC responses to expected aversive stimuli are larger if
expectations are uncertain (Sarinopoulos et al., 2010). The AIC is
also activated by anticipation of painful (Ploghaus et al., 1999) and
tactile stimuli (Lovero et al., 2009). Direct experimental evidence
of insular predictive coding, thoughnot specifically regarding inte-
roceptive signals, comes from an fMRI study of a gambling task
in which activity within spatially separate subregions of the AIC
encoded both predicted risk and risk prediction error (Preuschoff
et al., 2008). The risk prediction error signal exhibits a fast onset,
whereas the risk prediction signal (localized to a slightly more
superior and anterior AIC subregion) exhibits a slow onset; these
dynamics are consistent with respective bottom-up and top-down
origins in predictive coding frameworks (Preuschoff et al., 2008).
Consistent with the above findings, during performance of
the Iowa gambling task, AIC responses reflect risk prediction
error while striatal responses reflect reward prediction errors
(d’Acremont et al., 2009). During more classical instrumental
learning both AIC and striatal responses reflect reward prediction
error signals where, in contrast to striatal activity, AIC responses
correlate negatively with reward prediction error and during“loss”
trials only, possibly reflecting aversive prediction error (Pessiglione
et al., 2006). Risk, reward, and interoception are clearly closely
linked, as underlined by theories of decision-making and associ-
ated empirical data that emphasize the importance of internal
physiological responses in shaping apparently rational behav-
ior (Bechara et al., 1997; Damasio, 2000). These links are also
implied by the structural and functional interconnectivity of AIC
with the ACC and with orbitofrontal cortex and other reward-
related and decision-making structures (see The Insular Cortex,
Interoception, and Emotion).
Anterior insular cortex responses are implicated in other pre-
diction frameworks: AIC responses occur for conscious but not
unconscious errorsmade in an antisaccade task (Klein et al., 2007).
The AIC is proposed to be specifically involved in updating pre-
viously existing prediction models in reward learning contexts
(Palaniyappan and Liddle, 2011), and AIC activity elicited dur-
ing intentional action is suggested to provide interoceptive signals
essential for evaluating the affective consequences of motor inten-
tions (Brass and Haggard, 2010). This view aligns with our model
in emphasizing a connection between agency and presence.
A different source of evidence for interoceptive predictive cod-
ing comes from exogenous manipulations of interoceptive feed-
back. The experimental induction of mismatch between predicted
and actual interoceptive signals by false physiological feedback
enhances activation of right AIC (Gray et al., 2007), showing the
region to be a comparator. Moreover, this AIC activation, in con-
junction with amygdala, is associated with an increased emotional
salience attributed to previously unthreatening stimuli, consistent
with revision of top-down interoceptive predictions in the face of
unexplained error (Gray et al., 2007).
In summary, there is accumulating evidence for predictive sig-
naling in AIC relevant to risk and reward, as well as limited
evidence for interoceptive predictive coding arising from false
feedback evidence. Direct evidence for interoceptive predictive
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coding in the AIC has not yet been obtained and stands as a key
test of the present model.
DISORDERS OF AGENCY AND PRESENCE
A useful model should be able to account for features of relevant
disorders. As discussed, schizophrenic delusions of control are well
explained by the comparator model of agency in terms of prob-
lems with kinematic and sensory aspects of the forward modeling
component (Frith, 2011). Specifically, reduced precision of exte-
roceptive predictions coincides with greater delusions of control,
consistent with abnormal dopaminergic neurotransmission (Syn-
ofzik et al., 2010; see also The Role of Dopamine). Other first-rank
symptoms, for example thought insertion, are however less well
accounted for by current comparator models (Frith, 2011). Here,
we focus on the less extensively discussed disorders of presence.
DEPERSONALIZATION, DEREALIZATION, AND DPD
Depersonalization and derealization symptoms manifest as a dis-
ruption of conscious experience at very basic, preverbal level,most
colloquially as a “feeling of unreality” which can be equally inter-
preted as the absence of normal feelings of presence (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000). Depersonalization and derealiza-
tion are common as brief transient phenomena in healthy indi-
viduals, but may occur as a chronic disabling condition, either
as a primary disorder, DPD, or secondary to other neuropsychi-
atric illness such as panic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder,
and depression. Recent surveys of clinical populations suggest that
depersonalization/derealization may be the third most common
psychiatric symptom after anxiety and low mood (Stewart, 1964;
Simeon et al., 1997), and are experienced by 1.2–2% of the general
population in any given month (Bebbington et al., 1997; Hunter
et al., 2004). The chronic expression of these symptoms in DPD is
characterized by “alteration in the perception or experience of the
self so that one feels detached from and as if one is an outside
observer of one’s own mental processes”(American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). Two recent studies of DPD phenomenology
have shown that the condition is best considered a syndrome,
as chronic depersonalization involves qualitative changes in sub-
jective experience across a range of experiential domains (Sierra
et al., 2005; Simeon et al., 2008), encompassing abnormalities
of bodily sensation and emotional experience. Notably, DPD is
often accompanied by alexithymia, which refers to a deficiency in
understanding, processing, or describing emotions; more gener-
ally a deficiency of conscious access to subjective emotional states
(Simeon et al., 2009). In short, DPD can be summarized as a
psychiatric condition marked by the selective diminution of the
subjective reality of the self and world; a presence deficit.
Neuroimaging studies of DPD, though rare, reveal signifi-
cantly lower activation in AIC (and bilateral cingulate cortex)
as compared to normal controls when viewing aversive images
(Phillips et al., 2001). It has been suggested that DPD is associated
with a suppressive mechanism grounded in fronto-limbic brain
regions, notably the AIC, which “manifests subjectively as emo-
tional numbing, and disables the process by which perception and
cognition become emotionally colored, giving rise to a subjective
feeling of unreality”(Sierra and David, 2011). This mechanism
may therefore also underlie comorbid alexithymia.
In our model, DPD symptoms correspond to abnormal inte-
roceptive predictive coding dynamics. Whereas anxiety has been
associated with heightened prediction error signals (Paulus and
Stein, 2006), we suggest that DPD is associated with imprecise
interoceptive prediction signals Ppred in analogy with predictive
models of disorders of agency (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Syn-
ofzik et al., 2010). Our model therefore extends that of Paulus and
Stein (2006): Chronically high anxietymay result from chronically
elevated interoceptive prediction error signals, leading to overacti-
vation inAIC as a result of inadequate suppression of these signals.
In contrast, the imprecise interoceptive prediction signals associ-
ated with DPD may result in hypoactivation of AIC since there is
an excessive but undifferentiated suppression of error signals.
FROM HALLUCINATION AND DISSOCIATION TO DELUSION
Both psychotic illness and dissociative conditions encompass dis-
orders of perception and disorders of belief (delusions). In psy-
choses such as schizophrenia, disordered perception is manifest
as hallucinations while delusions are characterized by bizarre or
irrational self-referential beliefs such as thought insertion by aliens
or government agencies (Maher, 1974; Fletcher and Frith, 2009).
In dissociative disorders, disordered perceptions are characterized
by symptoms of self disturbance as in DPD which can evolve into
frankly psychotic delusional conditions such as the Cotard delu-
sion in which patients believe that they are dead (Cotard, 1880;
Young and Leafhead, 1996). Fletcher and Frith (2009) propose
that, for positive symptoms in psychoses, a Bayesian perspective
can accommodate hallucinations and delusions within a common
framework. In their compelling account, a shift fromhallucination
to delusion reflects readjustment of top-down predictions within
successively higher levels of cortical hierarchies, in successive
attempts to explain away residual prediction errors.
A similar explanation can apply to a transition from non-
delusional interoceptive dissociative symptoms in DPD to full-
blown (psychotic) delusions in Cotard and the like. To the extent
that imprecise predictions at low levels of (interoceptive) hierar-
chies are unable to suppress interoceptive prediction error signals,
imprecise predictions will percolate upward, eventually leading
not only to generalized imprecision across cortical hierarchical
levels but also to re-sculpting of abstract predictive models under-
lying delusional beliefs. This account augments the proposal of
Corlett et al. (2010)who suggest that the lack of emotional engage-
ment experienced by Cotard patients is surprising (in the Bayesian
sense), engendering prediction errors and re-sculpting of predic-
tive models; they do not however propose a role for interoceptive
prediction error. The account is also consistent with Young and
Leafhead (1996) who argued that the Cotard delusion develops as
an attempt to explain (“explain away,” in our view) the experien-
tial anomalies of severe depersonalization (Young and Leafhead,
1996). Interestingly, in one case study DPD symptoms ceased once
full-blown Cotard and Fregoli (another rare misidentification
delusion in which a familiar person is believe to be an imposter)
delusions were co-expressed (Lykouras et al., 2002), suggesting
that even a highly abstracted belief structure can be sufficient to
suppress chronically aberrant perceptual signals.
The phenomenon of intentional binding is relevant in this
context: actions and consequences accompanied by a sense of
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agency are perceived as closer together in time than they objec-
tively are; conversely, if the consequence is not perceived as the
result of the action, the events are perceived as more distant in
time than they actually are (Haggard et al., 2002). Importantly,
intentional binding has both a predictive and a retrospective com-
ponent: Schizophrenic patients with disorders of agency show
stronger intentional binding than controls (Voss et al., 2010), with
abnormalities most evident in the predictive component, reflect-
ing indiscriminate (i.e., imprecise) predictions (Synofzik et al.,
2010). In contrast, prodromal individuals (before development of
frankly psychotic symptoms) show an increased influence of both
predictive and retrospective components, consistent with elevated
prediction error signals (Hauser et al., 2011). These results sug-
gest a process through which abnormal prediction errors lead,
over time, to imprecise (and eventually reformulated) top-down
predictions. A similar account may apply for dissociative symp-
toms: As with psychosis, anxiety (associated with enhanced inte-
roceptive prediction error) is often prodromal to DPD and is a
typical general context for DPD symptoms (Paulus and Stein,
2006).
THE ROLE OF DOPAMINE
Dopaminergic neurotransmission is implicated at several points
in the discussion so far, most prominently as encoding precisions
within predictive coding. Here we expand briefly on the potential
importance of dopamine for the present model.
Seminal early work relevant to predictive coding showed
that dopaminergic responses to reward, recorded in the mon-
key midbrain, diminish when reward become predictable over
repeated phasic (diachronic) stimulus-reward presentations sug-
gesting that dopamine encodes a reward prediction error sig-
nal useful for learning (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000; Chor-
ley and Seth, 2011). More recently, Pessiglione et al. (2006)
found that reward prediction errors in humans are modulated
by dopamine levels. Modulation was most apparent in the stria-
tum but was also evident in the AIC. In considering this evi-
dence it is important to distinguish the phasic diachronic role
of dopamine in signaling reward prediction error (Schultz and
Dickinson, 2000) from its synchronic role in modulating (or
optimizing) the precision of prediction errors by modulating
signal-to-noise response properties in neuronal signaling (Fiorillo
et al., 2003; Friston, 2009, 2010). Although our model empha-
sizes the latter role, the learning function of dopamine may
nonetheless mediate the transition from disordered perception
to delusion. In this view, dopamine-modulated learning under-
lies the re-sculpting of generative models to accommodate per-
sistently elevated prediction error signals (Corlett et al., 2010).
Dopaminergic neurotransmission may therefore govern the bal-
ance between (synchronic) optimization of precisions at multi-
ple hierarchical levels (for both agency and presence) and the
reformulation of predictive models themselves, with both mecha-
nisms contributing to delusion formation. This account is also
compatible with an alternative interpretation of short-latency
dopaminergic signaling in identifying aspects of environmental
context and behavior potentially responsible for causing unpre-
dicted events (Redgrave and Gurney, 2006). In this view, short-
latency prediction error signals arising in the midbrain ventral
tegmental area are implicated in discerning whether afferent
sensory signals are due to self-generated actions or to external
causes.
Abnormal dopaminergic neurotransmission is observed in
the ACC of individuals with schizophrenia (Dolan et al., 1995;
Takahashi et al., 2006). Although nothing appears to be known
specifically about dopaminergic processing in the insula in indi-
viduals with either DPD or schizophrenia, the AIC is rich in
dopamineD1 receptors (Williams andGoldman-Rakic, 1998), and
both insula and the ACC also express high levels of extrastriatal
dopamine transporters, indicating widespread synaptic availabil-
ity of dopamine in these regions. Dopamine is also a primary
neurochemical underpinning a set of motivational functions that
engage the AIC, including novelty-seeking, craving, and nocicep-
tion (Palaniyappan and Liddle, 2011). A more general role for
dopamine in modulating conscious contents is supported by a
recent study showing that dopaminergic stimulation increases
both accuracy and confidence in the reporting of rapidly presented
words (Lou et al., 2011).
TESTING THE MODEL
To recap, we propose that presence results from successful sup-
pression by top-down predictions of informative interoceptive
signals evoked (directly) by autonomic control signals and (indi-
rectly) by bodily responses to afferent sensory signals. Testing
this model requires (i) the ability to measure presence and (ii)
the ability to experimentally manipulate predictions and pre-
diction errors independently with respect to both agency and
presence.
Measuring presence remains an important challenge. Subjec-
tive measures depend on self-report and can be formalized by
questionnaires (Lessiter et al., 2001); however these measures can
be unstable in that prior knowledge can influence the results (Free-
man et al., 1999). Directly asking about presence may also induce
or reduce experienced presence (Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005).
Alternatively, specific behavioral measures can test for equivalence
between real environments and VEs. However these measures
are most appropriate for a behavioral interpretation of presence
(Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005). Physiological measures can also
be used to infer presence, for example by recording heart rate vari-
ability in stressful environments (Meehan et al., 2002). Presence
can be measured indirectly by the extent to which participants
are able to perform cognitive memory and performance tasks that
depend on features of the VE (Bernardet et al., 2011), though
again these measures may correspond to a behavioral rather than
a phenomenal interpretation of presence. An alternative, subjec-
tive approach, involves asking subjects to modify aspects of a VE
until they report a level of immersion equivalent to that of a “ref-
erence”VE (Slater et al., 2010a). Finally, presence could be inferred
by the ability to induce so-called“breaks in presence”which would
not be possible if presence was lacking in the first place (Slater and
Steed, 2000). In practice, a combination of the above strategies is
likely to be the most useful.
Several technologies are available for experimentally manipu-
lating predictions and prediction errors. Consider first manipula-
tions of prediction error. In the agency component, these errors
can be systematically manipulated by, for example, interposing
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a mismatch between actions and sensory feedback using either
VR (Nahab et al., 2011) or by standard psychophysical meth-
ods (Blakemore et al., 1999; Farrer et al., 2008). In the presence
component, prediction errors could bemanipulated by subliminal
presentation of emotive stimuli prior to target stimuli (Tamietto
and deGelder, 2010) or by false physiological feedback (Gray et al.,
2007).Manipulations of top-down expectations could be achieved
bymodifying the context inwhich subjects are tested. For example,
expectations about self-generated versus externally caused action
can be manipulated by introducing a confederate as a potential
actor in a two-player game (Wegner, 2004; Farrer et al., 2008)
or by explicitly presenting emotionally salient stimuli to induce
explicit expectations of interoceptive responses.
EVIDENCE FROM VR
Important constraints on neural models of presence come from
experiments directly manipulating the degree of presence while
measuring neural responses. VR technology, especially when used
in combination with neuroimaging, offers a unique opportunity
to perform these manipulations (Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005).
In one study, a virtual rollercoaster ride was used to induce a sense
of presence while brain activity was measured using fMRI. This
study revealed a distributed network of brain regions elements
of which were both correlated, and anticorrelated, with reported
presence (Baumgartner et al., 2008). Areas showing higher activity
during strong presence include extrastriate and dorsal visual areas,
superior parietal cortex, inferior parietal cortex, parts of the ven-
tral visual stream, premotor cortex, and thalamic, brainstem, and
hippocampal regions, and notably the AIC. Other relevant stud-
ies have examined behavioral correlates of presence as modulated
by VR. In a non-clinical population, immersion in a VE enhances
self-reported dissociative symptoms on subsequent re-exposure
to the real environment, indicating that VR does indeed mod-
ulate the neural mechanisms underpinning presence (Aardema
et al., 2010). In another study, self-reported presence anticorre-
lated with memory recall in a structured VE (Bernardet et al.,
2011). Two recent studies speak to a connection between presence
and agency. In the first, the ability to exert control over events
in a VE substantially enhances self-reported presence in healthy
subjects (Gutierrez-Martinez et al., 2011). In the second, schizo-
phrenic patients performing a sensorimotor task in a VE reported
lower presence than controls, and for control subjects only, pres-
ence was modulated by perceived agency which was manipulated
bymodulating visual feedback in theVE (Lallart et al., 2009). These
results are consistent with our model in which predictive signals
emanating from the agency component influence presence.
Virtual reality has also been used to study the neural basis
of experienced agency. For example, VR-based manipulation of
the relationship between intended and (virtual) experienced hand
movements, applied in combination with fMRI, revealed a net-
work of brain regions that correlate with experienced agency, with
the right supramarginal gyrus identified as the locus of mismatch
detection (Nahab et al., 2011). Several recent studies have usedVR
to generalize the rubber-hand illusion to induce experiences of
heautoscopy (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Blanke and Metzinger,
2009) and body transfer into a VE (Slater et al., 2010b) [Heau-
toscopy is intermediate between autoscopy and full-blown out
of body experience (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009)]. These studies
have focused on body ownership and exteroceptive multisensory
integration rather than on presence or agency directly (though
see Kannape et al., 2010 with respect to agency). We speculate
that one reason why these so-called “full-body illusions” are diffi-
cult to induce is that, despite converging exteroceptive cues, there
remains an“interoceptive anchor”grounding bodily experience in
the physical body.
RELATED MODELS
Herewe briefly describe related theoreticalmodels of presence and
of insula function.Models of agency have already beenmentioned
(seeAn Interoceptive Predictive-CodingModel of Conscious Pres-
ence) and are extensively discussed elsewhere (David et al., 2008;
Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Corlett et al., 2010; Synofzik et al., 2010;
Voss et al., 2010; Frith, 2011; Hauser et al., 2011). Riva et al. (2011)
interpret presence as“the intuitive perceptionof successfully trans-
forming intentions into actions (enaction).” Their model differs
from the present proposal by focusing on action and behavior,
by assuming a much greater phenomenological and conceptual
overlap between presence and agency, and by not considering the
role of interoception or the AIC. Verschure et al. (2003) adopt a
phenomenological interpretation of presence, proposing an asso-
ciation with predictive models of sensory input based on learned
sensorimotor contingencies (Bernardet et al., 2011). While this
model incorporates predictions it does not involve interoception
or propose any specific neuronal implementation. Baumgartner
and colleagues propose a model based on activity within the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). In their model, DLPFC
activity downregulates activity in the visual dorsal stream, dimin-
ishing presence (Baumgartner et al., 2008). Conversely, decreased
DLPFC activity leads to increased dorsal visual activity, which
is argued to support attentive action preparation in the VE as
if it were a real environment. Supporting their model, bilateral
DLPFC activity was anticorrelated with self-reported presence in
their virtual rollercoaster experiment (Baumgartner et al., 2008).
However, application of transcranial direct current stimulation
to right DLPFC, decreasing its activity, did not enhance reported
presence (Jancke et al., 2009).
Models of insula function are numerous and cannot be cov-
ered exhaustively here. Among the most relevant is a model in
which AIC integrates exteroceptive and interoceptive signals with
computations about their uncertainty (Singer et al., 2009). In this
model, the AIC is assumed to engage in predictive coding for
both risk-related and interoceptive signals, however no particu-
lar mechanistic implementation is specified. The anxiety model
of Paulus and Stein (2006) introduces the idea of interoceptive
prediction errors in the AIC but does not specify a computational
mechanismor elaborate thenotionof interoceptive predictive cod-
ing as the constitutive basis of emotion. Palaniyappan and Liddle
(2011) leverage the concept of a salience network (see The Insular
Cortex, Interoception, and Emotion) to ascribe the insula with a
range of functions including detecting salient stimuli and modu-
lating autonomic andmotor responses via coordinating switching
between large-scale brain networks implicated in externally ori-
ented attention and internally oriented cognition and control.
In this model, psychotic hallucinations result from inappropriate
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proximal salience signals which in turn may arise from height-
ened uncertainty regarding the (diachronic) predicted outcome of
events. To our knowledge, no extant model proposes that the AIC
engages in interoceptive predictive coding underlying conscious
presence.
SUMMARY
We have described a theoretical model of the mechanisms under-
pinning the subjective sense of presence, a basic property of
normal conscious experience. The model is based on parallel pre-
dictive coding schemes, one relating to agency reflecting existing
“comparator” models of schizophrenia (Frith, 1987, 2011), and
a second based on interoceptive predictive coding. The model
operationalizes presence as the suppression of informative inte-
roceptive prediction error, where predictions (and correspond-
ing errors) arise (i) directly, via autonomic control signals, and
(ii) indirectly, via motor control signals which generate sensory
inputs. By analogy with models of agency (Synofzik et al., 2010),
the sense of presence is specifically associated with the preci-
sion of interoceptive predictive signals, potentially mediated by
dopaminergic signaling. Importantly, presence in the model is
associated with informative interoceptive afferent and predictive
signals, and not with the absence of interoceptive prediction errors
per se. The role of the agency component with respect to pres-
ence is critical; it provides predictions about future interoceptive
states on the basis of a parallel predictive model of sensorimotor
interactions. The joint activity of these predictive coding models
may instantiate key features of an integrated self-representation,
especially when considered alongside models of body ownership
based on proprioception and multisensory integration (Blanke
and Metzinger, 2009; Tsakiris, 2010). Converging evidence points
to key roles for the AIC and the ACC in instantiating predic-
tive models, both for interoceptive and exteroceptive signals, in
line with growing opinion that the AIC is a core neural sub-
strate for conscious selfhood (Critchley et al., 2004). In addition,
the model suggests a novel perspective on emotion, namely as
interoceptive inference along Helmholtzian lines. In this view,
emotional states are constituted by interoceptive predictions when
matched to inputs, extending early two-factor theories of emotion
(Schachter and Singer, 1962) as well as more recent proposals con-
tending that rapid affective predictions can shape exteroceptive
perceptions (Barrett and Bar, 2009) or that interoceptive predic-
tions can be useful for homeostatic regulation (Paulus and Stein,
2006).
The model is consistent with known neurobiology and phe-
nomenology of disorders of presence and agency. Presence deficits
are particularly apparent in DPD, which is known to involve
hypoactivity in the AIC. Associating disturbances of presence with
imprecise interoceptive predictions is also consistent with the fre-
quently comorbid alexithymia exhibited byDPDpatients.Anxiety,
often prodromal or comorbid with DPD is also accommodated by
the model in terms of enhanced prediction error signals, which
when sustained could lead to the imprecise predictions under-
lying dissociative symptoms. The hierarchical predictive coding
scheme may also account for transitions from disordered per-
ception to delusion as predictive mismatches percolate to suc-
cessively more abstract representational levels, eventually leading
to dopaminergically governed re-sculpting of predictive models
underlying delusional beliefs.
The model is amenable to experimental testing, especially by
leveraging powerful combinations of VR, neuroimaging, and psy-
chophysiology. These technological developments need however
to be accompanied by more sophisticated subjective scales reflect-
ing more accurately the phenomenology of presence. A basic
prediction of the model is that artificially induced imprecision
in interoceptive predictions should lead to diminished conscious
presence and abnormal AIC activity; by contrast, simple eleva-
tion of interoceptive prediction error signals should lead instead
to increased anxiety. As described in Section “Testing the Model,”
these manipulations could be engendered either by preexposure
to emotionally ambiguous but salient stimuli or by direct pharma-
cological manipulation affecting dopaminergic neuromodulation
in the AIC. A second basic prediction is that the AIC, as well
as other areas involved in interoceptive processing, should show
responses consistent with interoceptive predictive coding. For
example, by analogy with studies of repetition suppression, AIC
should show reduced responses for well predicted interoceptive
signals and enhanced responses when expectations are violated.
Third, the model predicts that distortions of presence may not
necessarily lead to distortions of agency; they will only do so if
agency-component predictions realign or change their precision
or structure in order to suppress faulty interoceptive prediction
errors. Further predictions can be based on the relative timing
of activity. In the visual domain, expectations about upcoming
sensory input reduce the latency of neuronal signatures differenti-
ating seen andunseen stimuli (Melloni et al., 2011); in otherwords,
expectations speed up conscious access. By analogy, an expected
interoceptive signal may be perceived as occurring earlier than an
unexpected interoceptive signal. This hypothesis could be tested
by manipulations of physiological feedback (Gray et al., 2007).
Potentially,VR experimental environments could be used not only
for testing the model but also for therapeutic purposes with DPD
patients.
Several challenges may be raised to the model as presently
posed. First, in contrast to exteroceptive (particularly visual) pro-
cessing (Felleman andVan Essen, 1991; Nassi and Callaway, 2009),
evidence for hierarchical organization of interoceptive process-
ing and autonomic control is less clear. Complicating any such
interpretation are multiple levels of autonomic control includ-
ing muscle reflex autonomic responses mediated at spinal levels,
direct influences of motor cortex on sympathetic responses to
muscle vasculature, varying degrees of voluntary effects on vis-
ceral state, and poorly understood effects of lateralization for
both afferent and efferent signals (Delgado, 1960; Craig, 2005;
Critchley et al., 2005; McCord and Kaufman, 2010). On the
other hand, there is reasonable evidence for somatotopic cod-
ing in brainstem nuclei (e.g., nucleus of the solitary tract and
area postrema), and subsequently in parabrachial nuclei, thala-
mic nuclei, and posterior insula (Craig, 2002), consistent with
hierarchical organization. It nonetheless remains as a challenge
to explore the extent to which interoception can be described,
anatomically and functionally, as hierarchical, when considered
for example in comparison to object representation in visual or
auditory systems.
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A second challenge is that predictive coding schemes for visual
perception are often motivated by the need for efficient pro-
cessing of high-bandwidth and highly redundant afferent visual
sensory signals (Rao and Ballard, 1999). The functional archi-
tecture of interoception appears very different, undermining any
direct analogy. However, interoceptive pathways involve dozens or
probably hundreds of different dedicated receptors often distrib-
uted broadly throughout the body (Janig, 2008), posing potentially
even greater computational challenges.
Third, clinical experience suggests that disorders of agency and
presence do not always coincide; for example it is not possible
to elicit reports of subjective disturbances of conscious pres-
ence in all patients with schizophrenia (Ruhrmann et al., 2010).
Moreover, depersonalization and derealization are not generally
associated with disorders of agency, as shown for example in Alien
Hand syndrome (Sumner and Husain, 2008) and Tourette syn-
drome (Robertson, 2000). While our model specifically allows for
independent effects and proposes that agency and presence are
neither necessary nor sufficient for each other, additional research
is needed to examine experimentally their interactions. It is pos-
sible that such studies could invert the hierarchical relationship
between agency and presence (see Figure 1) or reframe it as a
bidirectional, symmetric relationship. Further, lesions to insular
cortex donot always give rise to dissociative symptoms (Jones et al.,
2010), raising the possibility that the predictive processes underly-
ing presence play out across multiple brain regions with key nodes
potentially extending down into brainstem areas (Damasio, 2010).
Alternatively, dissociative symptoms could in fact require an intact
insula in order to generate the imprecise predictions underlying
the subjective phenomenology.
Finally, our model remains agnostic as to whether it is pres-
ence itself, or the experience of its disturbance or absence, that is
the core phenomenological explanatory target. Arguably, distur-
bances of presence are more phenomenologically salient than the
background of presence characterizing normal conscious expe-
rience. Reportable experience of presence per se may require
additional reflective attention of the form induced by subjec-
tive questionnaires. A full treatment of this issue would refer
back at least as far as the phenomenological work of Heidegger
and Husserl (Heidegger, 1962; Husserl, 1963), by way of Met-
zinger’s discussion of transparency (see The Phenomenology of
Presence), lying well beyond the present scope. Nonetheless, by
proposing specific neurocognitive constraints our model provides
a framework for understandingpresence as a structural property of
consciousness that is susceptible to breakdown (inducing an expe-
rience of the “absence of presence”) in particular and predictable
circumstances.
Addressing the above challenges will require multiple research
agendas. However, three key tests underpinning many of them are
(i) to search explicitly for signs of interoceptive predictive coding
in the AIC, (ii) to establish the nature of the target representa-
tion of discrete channels of afferent viscerosensory information
instantiating such predictive coding schemes, and (iii) to correlate
subjective disturbances in presence with experimental manipu-
lations of interoceptive predictions and prediction errors. More
prospectively, the model requires extension to address explicitly
issues of selfhood.Webelieve considerable promise lies in integrat-
ing interoceptive predictive coding with existing proprioceptive
andmultisensorymodels of selfhood (Blanke andMetzinger,2009;
Tsakiris, 2010), potentially explaining the force of “interoceptive
anchors” in grounding bodily experience.
In conclusion, ourmodel integrates previously disparate theory
and evidence from predictive coding, interoceptive awareness and
the role of the AIC and ACC, dopaminergic signaling, DPD and
schizophrenia, and experiments combiningVRandneuroimaging.
It develops a novel view of emotion as interoceptive inference and
provides a computationally explicit, neurobiologically grounded
account of conscious presence, a fundamental but understud-
ied phenomenological property of conscious experience.We hope
the model will motivate new experimental work designed to test
its predictions and address its objections. Such efforts are likely
to generate important new findings in both basic and applied
consciousness science.
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